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THE LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION by James Wm. Moore and Robert
S. Oglebay. Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. Two Volumes. Pp.
5837. $35.00.
THE law of corporate reorganizations is outstanding among those legal
fields in which flourish new ideas, new controversies, new growths, new prob-
lems, new solutions. To write a treatise purporting to cover its beginnings,
evolutions, and frontiers, its practice and theory, requires high courage; to
succeed as have Moore and Oglebay in these volumes requires, in addition,
such scholarly ability and legal insight as are seldom found.
Corporate reorganizations originated in the ingenuity of those lawyers
and judges who, late in the last century, evolved the consent receivership
from the unsatisfied judgment creditor's suit in equity as a means of pre-
venting the dismemberment by creditors of bankrupt American railroads. Use
of the equity receivership, an alternative far preferable in most cases to liq-
uidation, later spread to ordinary business corporations. Nevertheless, like
most Topsy-grown methods, reorganizations by receivership suffered grave
defects: procedures and theory were cumbersome and indirect; courts were
either hampered by or were indifferent to a lack of control over essential
parts of the reorganization process; and consequently, abuses were numerous
and varied.' The limitations of the equity receivership as a vehicle for pre-
serving going-concern values became so evident in the rush of corporate fail-
ures following 1929 that in 1933 Congress enacted Section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act for railroads and in 1934 Section 77B for business corporations.
Both statutes sought to provide a comprehensive procedure for efficient and
equitable reorganizations. In operation, however, Section 77B proved in-
adequate to the task, and in 193S Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, though
retaining the basic patterns of Section 77B, replaced it as a revised, amplified
and improved means of reorganization.
The authors properly view Chapter X both in its historical setting as an
effect of preceding causes, more economic than legal, and in its legal setting
as a complex statute to be construed with the aid of all available tools.2
Their approach is, section-wise, rather than according to topics. They state
each section's derivation, its relation to other parts of the act, and then pro-
1. While the equity receivership's faults cannot be minimized, see New England
Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R., 143 F.2d 179 (C.C.A2d 1944), the success attained by
using a legal form designed for a purpose entirely different from reorganization is re-
markable. Such improvised methods of reorganization are disparagingly called "versions
of the 'one hoss shay"' by the authors of the volume under review. See p. 2(. It must
be remembered, however, that the one hoss shay "w%-as built in such a logical way it ran
a hundred years to a day!'
2. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoL. L. REv.
527 (1947).
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ceed to analyze with particularity its terms. This sectional method necessitates
in some instances much cross-referencing in order for one fully to grasp a topic,
but repetition or synopsis of material placed elsewhere is used to mitigate the
difficulty, especially when dealing with major subjects, such as jurisdiction.8
Moore's predilection for the procedural point of view4 and its concomitant,
practicability, is felt throughout the work. Theoretical discussion is always
tied to purposes and results,5 and concepts never gain sufficient altitude to
cause either authors or readers, in craning their necks, to forget their feet.
The cases, for example, are usually analyzed in terms of their facts and hold-
ings rather than the legal reasoning linking the two. Only rarely, such as
when discussing the effects of corporate dissolution upon a debtor's capacity
to petition for reorganization," do the authors do more than distill a case to
its practical meaning and apply it as a logical premise toward a practical end.
This is a virtue to the reader, however, for the method of Chapter X reor-
ganizations is thus explained with utmost clarity and precision, undisturbed
by flights up spiral staircases. In fact it would be impossible to do more
than this in view of the broad scope of subject matter and the necessity of
keeping the book's length within bounds.
7
The'positions taken and maintained by Moore and Oglebay demonstrate
their more than intimate knowledge of the statute and the interpretations so
far made by the courts. When courts have apparently strayed, the authors do
not hesitate to act shepherd, although the decisions of the Second Circuit
and the positions adopted in these volumes are notably inter-harmonious. Sim-
ilarly, as to problems which have not yet been presented to the courts, but may
well be anticipated, Moore and Oglebay offer guiding views, a valuable charac-
teristic usually found only in larger works of more leisurely pace.8
This is a book for practitioners and scholars alike. It is clearly the most
important work on Chapter X at the present time, and it will prove increas-
ingly valuable as the law of corporate reorganizations continues to expand.
Need for such a body of law comes to us as part of the era of corporations:
some business entities may fail and be dismissed without loss; others may
fail, but becaue of their economic worth must be sustained and preserved.
This treatise is an indispensable aid to performing that function.
Joux' GrRDEsf
3. Pp. 567-778.
4. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE (1938).
5. See, e.g., pp. 2879-89.
6. Pp. 1413-16.
7. The 5837 pages stated at the head of this review to be the length of the book
need not frighten potential readers; there are sizeable gaps in pagination, some two or
three hundred pages long, to enable later insertions into the text.
8. Such as PAUL AND MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934); WieMoaE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) ; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936).
tMember, New York Bar; Professor of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations,
New York University School of Law; Chairman, Committee on Railroad and Corporate
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HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING. By Charles E. Clark. St. Paul:
West Publishing Company, 1947. Pp. 744. $6.00.
JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK'S book on Code Pleading, published in 1928, has
become a classic of its kind. The new and revised edition will be eagerly wel-
comed by the legal profession.
I never thought it could be said that a book on code pleading would make
enjoyable reading. I do not venture to go as far as Baron Parke who, when a
legal friend of his was ill, went to his bedside, taking with him a special de-
murrer which had been submitted to him. It was so exquisitely drawn, Baron
Parke said, that he felt sure it must cheer the patient to read it. What I do say
is that those who take up Judge Clark's book will find they have never learned
so much about a subject so agreeably.
True, pleading today hardly occupies the unique position it did in England
when Tidd, the great Special Pleader of his time, wrote his mnagnitz opus and
when budding barristers competed and paid well for the privilege of being
initiated into the mysteries of the art in his chambers. Today interest in
pleading is no longer confined to a small group of specialists. Much of the
abracadabra has been cleared away. However, although an error in pleading
may no longer be fatal as it was at common law, the subject is still greatly
misunderstood, and it is still enveloped in many misconceptions, some of
which are traceable to inadequate and obsolete methods of instruction.
The second edition of Judge Clark's textbook was long overdue. As the au-
thor says in his Preface to the new volume:
"A second edition of this book has been made imperative by the
quite amazing resurgence of interest in pleading and procedure
which has had a profound effect upon procedural ideas and objec-
tives in practically all American jurisdictions, culminating in the
complete reform of civil practice in the courts of the United States
and of several of the states."'
I
Though the general outline of his book has not been greatly changed, the
old edition has been thoroughly revised and brought completely up to date. It
is really a remarkable book--one not only to read, but one to keep and to
study. If I had to limit myself to a single volume on code pleading, this is the
book I should choose. Indeed, I consider it indispensable to student, teacher,
practicing lawyer, judge and reformer. This is a very broad assertion but I
have no hesitancy in making it.
The editors of Maitland's Lectures on Equily are reported to have said that
after hearing them, "equity, in our minds a formless mystery, became intelli-
gible and interesting." It would be no exaggeration to make the same observa-
Reorganizations, National Bankruptcy Conference; Chairman, Committee on Corporate
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tion about Judge Clark's treatise. Within the compass of a single volume of
some 750 pages it presents comprehensively, clearly, concisely and accurately
the present-day principles and rules of code pleading in the various jurisdic-
tions, their evolutionary history and background, new developments and
trends and suggestions for improvement and reform.
The book is well produced, has large clear type and contains an extensive
table of cases and a helpful index which is skillfully prepared. The leading
cases in the various jurisdictions are considered and analyzed, and the au-
thorities are collated in the notes, which are most detailed and comprehensive.
An invaluable feature of the book is the reference to pertinent articles in the
legal periodicals. The importance of these law review articles, many of them
trail-blazers in the field, can hardly be over-emphasized. Much time and effort
went into the research involved and Judge Clark gives full credit to the two
young lawyers who assisted him in this work.
Despite the compression necessary to cover the material within the limits of
a single, compact volume, the subject matter is presented in a lucid, attractive
and authoritative manner. Complicated propositions are treated with astonish-
ing ease and clarity. Brevity is sometimes baffling, but a master of his subject
(and Judge Clark has given a lifetime of study to it) attains conciseness with-
out yielding to generalization and ambiguity. One marvels at the skill with
which the salient points are often crystallized in a single, simple sentence. A
captious critic might regret the failure to expand certain of the more eco-
nomically expressed passages, but the great merit of the book is that it does
not purport to be encyclopaedic in character. True, for the active practitioner,
it might be well to supplement it with a form book, as Judge Clark himself
suggests, or with a book on local practice and procedure such as, for example,
the new edition of Carmody's Manual of New York Civil Practice by Carr,
Finn and Saxe. In the last analysis, however, and in spite of minor variations
of local practice, the basic problems of code pleading remain the same.
Modern code pleading may be said to date from the enactment of the Field
Code in New York in 1848. The most distinctive reform effected by the Field
Code was that "relating to the abolition of the common law forms of action
and to the union of legal and equitable remedies in a common system," with
provision for a single form of action, "the civil action of the code." Notwith-
standing this great reform, it is most discouraging, as Judge Clark so trench-
antly points out, that one hundred years later we still find cases in New York
which throw a suitor out of court because he has mistaken his remedy and has
sued in equity when he should have sued at law.
All of us would sympathize with Judge Clark's plaint that after a century
of pleading reform, lawyers and judges are still engaged in the vain task of
distinguishing between allegations of fact, law and evidence, Even here
Judge Clark does not seek refuge in sweeping generalizations but grasps the
nettle firmly and makes a helpful analysis of the cases.
It is to be expected that there will be differences of opinion concerning
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some of the views expressed by Judge Clark. For e-xample, it may be urged
that perhaps he states the rule too broadly when he says that the adequacy of
another remedy does not bar an action for a declaratory judgment. It is so
provided in the Federal Rules and the cases in other jurisdictions seem to up-
hold that view. The true question, it would seem, is whether the other remedy
is really adequate for the party seeking relief, and if so, the court in the
proper exercise of its discretion should not entertain the action for declaratory
judgment.
Again, some will believe that his stricture on the use of bills of particulars
in New York and the method of obtaining them, particularly in negligence
cases, is much too severe. My own experience has been that the rules on this
subject have had beneficial results (New York Rules of Civil Practice, 115-
117). Of course Judge Clark's emphasis on the broad use of discovery, as it
is permitted under the English and the Federal Rules, tends to minimize the
importance and perhaps the necessity of bills of particulars. But under the
procedural law of New York, as it stands at present, the bill of particulars
has an essential place.
In the course of years, Judge Clark has developed an attitude towards
pleading which might well be called a philosophy of pleading. There is, how-
ever, nothing of the dogmatic doctrinaire about him. He waves a friendly
hand at what he calls "notice pleading," which is in general a very brief state-
ment giving some facts, presenting a very broad issue and designed merely to
give notice of the claim to the opponent. At the same time he is careful to
point out that "it is perhaps doubtful if we are now prepared to go to the
complete lengths of brevity urged by the proponents of notice pleading, except
in isolated cases. But without so doing," Judge Clark says, "we may properly
put the emphasis where they do. This, it seems, is in effect the modern tend-
ency. The aim of pleadings should be therefore to give reasonable notice of
the pleader's case to the opponent and to the court. This does not go as far as
the technical notice pleading, since it requires notice of the pleader's entire
cause, not merely that he has a claim." - Some may not prefer "notice plead-
ing," as distinguished from "fact pleading," but we bear in mind Judge
Clark's "prophetic alignment with tendencies which have become increasingly
dominant" in this field of the law.
Judge Clark is a firm believer in the principle that a party coming to trial
should not be taken by surprise and he has no sympathy with the American
fear and distrust of disclosure before trial. The English rules on this point
were substantially adopted in the revision of our Federal Rules of Civil Prac-
tice, in the formulation of which Judge Clark played so large a part, as mem-
ber and reporter of the committee appointed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
He urges the value of pre-trial procedure as it is employed under the Eng-
lish and under the new Federal Rules. Surprisingly enough, that procedure is
2. P. 57.
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not resorted to in the New York Supreme Court,- First Judicial District,
where it is especially needed because of the congested jury calendars. And,
finally, he emphasizes the importance of placing the rule-making power, with
respect to pleading and procedure, in the hands of the judges, as is done in
England and under the federal practice. In New York we have endeavored
to obtain legislation to give this rule-making power to the Court of Appeals,
where it properly belongs. The effort thus far has been unsuccessful, but it
is the right thing to do and it is bound to come.
This book is the rich product of Judge Clark's broad experience and deep
concern with problems of pleading. His many pioneering and penetrating
articles on various phases of that subject have exercised a formative influence
on the development of that important branch of the law. With necessary
revisions at regular intervals, this textbook will stand as the authoritative
work of reference on the subject; it will serve as an accurate, helpful, practi-
cal guide to the existing law. It will also stimulate an interest in pleading and
in intelligent, enlightened procedural reform. It will do much to help improve
the administration of justice.
BERNARD L. SHinNTAGt
Fop THE DEFENSE: THOMAS ERSKINE, THE MOST ENLIGHTENED LIBERAL
OF His TIMES, 1750-1823. By Lloyd Paul Stryker. New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1947. Pp. 624. $5.00.
THOIMtAS ERSKINE is usually rated as the most accomplished advocate be-
fore a jury ever to appear in the British or American bar. The lawyers
and historians, who do not often agree on interpretations of history, are
generally agreed on this. Erskine was a younger son of the Earl of Buchan,
a Scotch noble of long lineage but short purse. He was born in Edinburgh
and lived in the period of Sheridan, the younger Pitt, Jefferson, Madison and
Marshall. He was born as the French and Indian Wars began and he lived
to see Napoleon rise and fall.
He entered the bar late, when twenty-eight years old, after many years as
a very junior officer in both the nayy and army of Britain. He managed,
however, to meet the costs of two years at Cambridge and a contemporaneous
three years' enrollment in Lincoln's Inn, in spite of having a family to sup-
port and no fortune. Erskine rocketed to prominence in the bar almost at
once.
It happened that a libel case involving the treatment of naval veterans was
in the public eye. Erskine by chance fell in with the defendant, impressed
him with his enthusiasm and knowledge of the position of sailors and was em-
ployed as one of the counsel. This accident accelerated his career but Erskine
f Justice of the Appellate Division, State of New York, First Department.
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was, of course, freighted with success. He had been writing since childhood,
was a tireless reader of Shakespeare and Milton and was used to discussing
public affairs. He was soon out of debt, and earning $50,000 a year. The
fees of his whole career totalled nearly a million dollars, a sum previously
unknown in London. He was not a precise lawyer or indeed a legal scholar
at all; practically the whole of his work was before juries at the King's Bench.
Except in his late years, when he served briefly as Lord Chancellor, he had
little to do with appeal cases and less with equity. His own recognition of
this is shown by the curious motto he chose for his coat-of-arms when given
a peerage-"Trial by Jury."
Erskine's practice was predominantly in three types of common law trials,
namely, criminal cases, adultery charges (then politely phrased as "criminal
conversation") and commercial questions. In the last named class, he played
a large part in Lord Mansfield's famous adoption of commercial custom into
the common law. The adultery cases made his material fortune, but the
criminal cases made his fame and left us in print a large number of jury ad-
dresses which remain today bmong the finest models in any language of the
advocate's art. Erskine's career is notably free from suspicions of trickery
which so often shadow the life of the advocate. In spite of years in Parliament
his political activities were not of much consequence, and his Chancellorship
was so short it left little impression. Our hero was a specialist in talking to
twelve men in a box.
In the book before us, Mr. Stryker, himself a well known New York ad-
vocate, has chosen to pick out one strand in the cord of Ersldne's life and
use it as a thread on which to string many bright beads of London history
and London personalities. His book depicts Erskine almost exclusively as the
knight errant of free speech in England, particularly during the years when
the younger Pitt was trying to suppress all expression of sympathy for revo-
lutionary France. Then was a period appallingly like our own, for Britain
was seeing in the French Revolution and Napoleon not only all the hostility
and danger we see recently in Soviet Russia but also the same sort of effort
by a foreign enemy to undermine a nation from within. Erskine's service as
a defender of men, mostly of good will, who had a word to say for the merits
of the French Revolution, is a legitimate side of his life to select and exploit.
The theme rolls smoothly in today's current of public philosophy which gets
much comfort out of defending freedom of expression, when other checks on
arbitrary government are weakening. The result is not a rounded life of
Erskine, but an account of one role woven into a texture of pleasant digres-
sions into the story of his times and friends.
There have been many biographies of Erskine, perhaps as many as of any
lawyer in English history. -None have been widely read. The full account
of a professional specialist, even one with a famous clientele, is of interest
mostly to readers who work with the same tools. Mr. Stryker might have
written a skillfull and analytical account of the advocate's professional meth-
19471
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ods. Some of us who are fascinated by such figures as Erskine, William
Pinkney, Luther Martin, Joseph Choate and other histrionic lawyers might
have enjoyed such a book. He has instead written a pleasant and discursive
book in which George III, George IV, Beau Brummell, Queen Caroline, Na-
poleon, Tom Paine and other entertaining people emerge almost as carefully
depicted as Erskine himself.
A number of his trials are described, sometimes with license for imagina-
tion now granted popular biographers, but so far as this reviewer's knowledge
goes, never unfaithfully. The case already mentioned as Erskine's first chance
(King v. Baillie)1 is succeeded by accounts of the court martial of Admiral
Keppel, and then the defense of Lord Gordon for his part in the terrible
Gordon Riots. In both Erskine successfully defended. He entered Parliament
but historians agree he was strangely ineffective in that forum. In 1784 he
defended the well-known case against the Dean of St. Asaph, which led nearly
a decade later to Fox's libel law, giving the jury at last the right to pass on the
question of the libel itself, and not merely on its publication.
The book goes on to give a brief account of the Stockdale libel case which
arose out of Warren Hastings' long prosecution. We are then carried off
into French events and to Erskine's attempt to defend the circulation of Tom
Paine's Righa of Man. The trial of Frost for sedition and of the "Morn-
ing Chronicle" for circulating criticism of the government, of Walker and of
the shoemaker Hardy, all are recounted as all were part of the same official
effort to suppress criticism colored by events of the French Revolution.
Erskine is shown as increasingly successful in defense for even in the pic-
turesque trial of Tooke he helped the defendant to acquit himself and in the
case of Hadfield obtained the release of the defendant on a plea of insanity
after he had unsuccessfully shot at George III in a theatre, much as Booth
murdered LinColn.
Erskine soon was appointed Lord Chancellor, for in 1806, his party, the
Whigs, were recognized in the Grenville government. The equity bar pro-
tested the appointment of a jury barrister to the chancery bench but the new
Baron Erskine was conscientious in his work and did quite well. His day as a
barrister was now closed forever, of course. He was Chancellor only fourteen
months; the rest of his public career was in the House of Lords. Nearly all
the last third of the book is given to the personal history and trial of Queen
Caroline, in which Erskine's part was not very considerable. Her story ob-
viously fascinates the author as it has so many literary men.
The great barrister lived on after his chancellorship for nearly fifteen
years, an actor almost without a role, much in society, speaking now and
then in the House of Lords, drawing his substantial pension as an ex-Chancel-
lor but getting poorer day by day. "Counsellor Ego" was no longer pulled
through London streets by cheering mobs. At 68, he was married a second
time to a former servant girl after years of life as a widower.
1. 21 How. St. Tr. 1 (1816).
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The book is written with verve, sparkle and clarity and the author has read
widely in the chronicles of the period. He ranges over so vast a field of
British, European and even American history that slips must inevitably occur.
Even this reviewer notices some. For example, "tunics," so often mentioned
in connection with Erskine's military service as a youth were not introduced
into the British army until after Napoleon's era. Soldiers wore longtaiIed
coats, as the prints of our Revolutionary War reveal. Wellington was not
a "spare, tall soldier,"- but five feet nine. "Lord Bacham" is a missprint for
"Lord Barham" as any British schoolboy would know. But these are trivia;
the lawyer with an interest in his professional history has a book here long
enough for many a pleasant evening and the citizen concerned about a contest
between America and the Soviet will find meat to chew in the account of the
reaction of England to revolutionary France.
JAMES Ga,-roN RoGERs
THIE CASE FOR REGIONAL PLANNING With Special Reference to New Eng-
land. By the Directive Committee on Regional Planning. Yale University.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. Pp. 94. $10.00.
THE sponsoring Committee is careful to define the scope of their initial
publication. Its "principal purpose . . . is to emphasize the need for re-
gional planning, both in New England and throughout the country, and sug-
gest the outlines of an administrative organization which will permit the pool-
ing of all the powers and resources necessary to effective regional planning,
without an overconcentration of power in the federal government or a damp-
ening of local and private initiative. It is not an effort to offer a specific plan
for New England but rather to suggest how New England, or any other
region, can achieve and implement appropriate plans."' The book is there-
fore not a "plan", and must not be judged as such.
Essentially it is a statement of philosophy, endeavoring to divest the word
"planning" of some of the bogey-man draperies with which it has recently
been clothed and to show that the planning process has always been utilized in
one form or another, is quite compatible with democracy, and indeed that it
is now "impossible for the people of the United States to achieve their tra-
ditional democratic values, to any reasonable degree, without the most fore-
sighted and vigorous action at all levels of governmental and voluntary ac-
tivity."
2
Broad definitions and working classifications are attempted, among them
2. P. 398.
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identification of the region as "the community which offers the greatest op-
portunity for taking advantage of the vast potentialities, made possible by
modern technology and institutions, for moulding the material environment
to the satisfaction of human needs."3  Considerable space is devoted to es-
tablishing that New England is indeed such a region.
To quote further from the introductory summary, "the problems of New
England, and of any region, are defined as the disparities between the opti-
mum basic human values that it can afford and the actual state of achieve-
ment of such values; and some indication is made of the type of question
which must be asked and answered if New England, or any other region, is to
take, and maintain, an adequate inventory of its potentialities, its achieve-
ments, and its efficiency. Some of the more obvious existing disparities in
New England are mentioned."
'4
Finally, a strong case is made for "the establishment, through concurrent
state and federal action, of a Regional Development Administration, with the
states pooling their powers and resources by interstate compact and with the
federal government adding the appropriate powers of a federal public cor-
poration, such as are exercised by the Tennessee Valley Authority."5  This
argument is reinforced by a valuable and detailed study0 by Asa D. Sokolow
which appears in the appendix.
Handsome diagrams dramatize the classic steps in the planning process
from the initial "pilSt study" hypothesis, through detailed analysis of all con-
ditioning factors (classified as "people and their values", "institutions and
resources", "design", and "government") to Diagnosis, Synthesis, Design
and Action. And some of the components which prove New England a re-
gion and illustrate its planning problems are clearly and beautifully mapped
in color.
With the general purpose of this book everyone interested in the planning
field, or in New England per se, must be in hearty sympathy. Its philosophic
approach is also welcome in a country whose planning literature too often
neglects any statement of principle, purpose or process, submerging the reader
directly in a welter of minute facts and statistics. This habitual neglect of
social theory on the part of American planners, whether from allergy, ignor-
ance or "practicality", is indeed a major reason for their vulnerability to the
onslaughts of anti-planners like Hayek and Robert Moses. The reactionaries
at least have a point of view which they consistently defend. If this reviewer
questions some aspects of the planning philosophy of Yale's Directive Com-





6. Reprint of Comment, Governmental Techniques for the Conservation and UlliLza-
tiots of Water Resources: at Analysis and Proposal, 56 YALE L. J. 276 (1947).
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One welcome cornerstone of their argument is the unqualified assumption
that "planning without points of control is mere drafting and dreaming.",
The long and barren succession of advisory city plans, for the most part filed
away and forgotten as soon as the bills were paid, should have made this idea
a truism by now. But the planning profession is still largely unconvinced
and David Lilienthal's classic exposition of the theme that effective planning
cannot be divorced from responsibility for action has been well-nigh unique
in the field."
The fact that planning is most urgently needed for areas which do not co-
incide with present state and local government boundaries-regions, metro-
politan districts, neighborhoods-is of course under wide discussion today.
But the amount and quality of research into the knotty political and adminis-
trative problems arising from this fact is still surprisingly thin and gives
special significance not only to this book but also to much additional work at
Yale under the leadership of Professor McDougal, particularly on the ques-
tion of metropolitan reorganization.
Despite these virtues, however, the study seems to me vague and unrealistic
on several points so fundamental to the question of how "New England, or
any other region, can achieve and implement appropriate plans" that they
should have been clarified even at this frankly introductory stage.
The Committee predicates a fiat regional agency with the broadest kind of
overall planning purpose and powers, coupled with an advance "commitment
by the states, as well as by the federal government, to abide by, and assist in
the development of, all plans which may be brought forward by an agency of
their joint creation." 9
Stated as they are in terms of abstract logic, the steps outlined sound en-
tirely plausible. New England needs a "central intelligence", hence a regional
planning agency with overall jurisdiction and powers. Careful and minute
Analysis by the agency of all conditioning factors leads to Diagnosis and Syn-
thesis-to "the selective focus and the ordered emphasis upon relative impor-
tance that are indispensable to effective planning" 10-thence to Design and
Action.
Stated in terms of the dynamics of a democracy still devoted to private en-
terprise, nothing could be more unthinkable. An effective planning agency
must have power, yes, but such powers must be clearly delimited, above all
for an agency dealing with an area such as a region or metropolitan district
unlikely within the visible future to have either direct representative govern-
ment or unified taxation. The average American citizen is little likely to de-
velop a sudden religious passion for "planning" in the abstract, particularly
by an agency removed from direct regular check by voters. What he can
7. P.72.
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understand are such concrete needs as cheaper power, better housing, more
efficient communications, or whatnot. The specific responsibility for meet-
ing such needs he may be willing to delegate to a regional authority. But to
concoct an agency, several steps removed from the voters in the area, with
open-ended powers to devise and carry out plans, is both administratively un-
sound and politically impossible.
TVA is our classic example of successful regional planning in the sense of
both political acceptance and visible achievement. But it is perhaps not al-
ways recognized how extremely concrete and limited are its actual powers:
the control and development of water resources in the interests of navigation,
flood control and cheap electricity. Its success as an overall planning agency
is simply due to an extraordinary will and ability to make these key activities
the "fulcrum . . . for many changes"'!-changes achieved largely by educa-
tion and demonstration rather than coercion.
If TVA needs more power some delegation from the states might well be
in order, but certainly other- regions will require a quite different set of
powers. The principle of selection and clear delimitation, however, remains
the same, a principle which, incidentally, is as thoroughly borne out by Mr.
Sokolow's appended study as it is neglected in the text.
If this be true, then the whole process is necessarily reversed, and the
would-be planners' responsibility thereby becomes much greater and more
immediate. Before legislation can even be drafted to set up the agency to
make the surveys and carry out the plan, it is necessary to discover, isolate,
and focus attention on those few concrete issues which, on the one hand, are
capable of galvanizing public interest and demand, and, on the other, would
provide effective handles for broader regional reform and reorganization.
Another weakness of this study is its failure to define the basic generic dif-
ference between the regional problems of New England and those of, say, the
Tennessee Valley or the west coast, a difference so great that it may well
affect the entire pattern of strategy and process.
It is one thing to plan for a backward or relatively new area still to be en-
riched by full development of industry and commerce. The worst enemies in
such a situation are ignorance and inertia. Vested economic interests are a
lesser obstacle since it can usually be shown that almost all groups stand to
gain in the long run, even in purely private profit terms and without serious
sacrifice or upheaval along the way. Yet the job is notwithstanding difficult
enough politically, as the planners of the Northwest will testify.
But to plan for New England, the first and for a long period the principal
center of manufacturing in the country, heavily capitalized, thickly popu-
lated, its skills and resources highly developed and its institutions organized
to the point of rigidity-a region moreover which finds itself increasingly off-
center as population and production move westward-is quite another thing.
11. LiLMNTrHA op. cil. =pra note 8, at 87.
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New England has more parallels with Old England than it has with the Ten-
nessee Valley or the Northwest.
Here it is not just a question of planning ncw development providing max-
imum benefit for everyone. Painful readjustments are essential before a pe-
riod of fresh development can get under way. Obsolete plant and equipment
must be written off, inflated property values written down by owner, lender
and tax-assessor, and traditional skills must be transformed into new ones.
Cherished privileges, and values long taken for granted, social as well as eco-
nomic, may be lost or redistributed in the process.
It is quite possible (despite the soothing but unsupported optimism of the
Yale Committee on this point) that New England should still lose some of
her population to newer regions, but shrinkage is an art yet to be mastered
gracefully or happily within a capitalist economy. It is an art, however,
which must be learned in many other areas and urban centers before very
long, perhaps in the country as a whole. There is no issue providing a greater
challenge for renewal of creative Yankee leadership in modem terms.
The job can be done. New England still has real resources in its people, its
land, its history. It is still a vital region whose efficiency and well-being are
essential to the nation. As the Yale Committee rightly emphasizes, it can
still sell quality in many forms to the rest of the world-special skills in pro-
duction and management-and, they might have added, prestige in educa-
tion and culture and magnificent recreational resources. But "quality" is a
precarious and evanescent form of capital, requiring not only conservation
but constant dynamic renewal from within.
It can be done: in fact England herself is doing it at this moment. But
the big question is: can it be done without just such a conscious majority vil
for drastic political-economic change, such hopeful zeal for turning adversity
into creative social progress, as underlie the new British programs for land
and resource planning?
The Yale Committee does not pose this question. Its bold proposals are
curiously coupled with a political philosophy akin to that of the old-time city
planners. According to this view, planning is a kind of manna beneficial to
all alike, hence above crude right-left controversy. Order, pure reason, sci-
entific progress and enlightened self-interest will triumph in the long run: no
need to irritate the powers that be with vulgar political agitation.
The truth is that even the smallest reform, any attack on the status quo,
every increase in public responsibility in the public interest, requires a con-
siderable degree of just such agitation to get started, however respectable it
may become later. A century ago it was public education, then public health,
now cheap power, social security, housing.
It is sheer nonsense to state as a working principle that there is in this
country "a fundamental agreement, which transcends all groups and occupa-
tions, about the basic democratic values involved in sharing power, respect,
knowledge, health, income, and safety and an agreement which can be re-
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duced to relatively concrete goals in terms of voting, nondiscrimination,
schools, medical care, nutrition, homes, clothing, and so on."112 When it
comes to the test of public action or expense to implement them, there is no
such mystic universal agreement on any of these values or goals. There is,
however, a potential majority agreement on many of them, shifting and un-
certain yet capable of fruitful action-if the people are politically educated
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